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An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict Paperback – 30 Nov. 2017
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- ISBN-101849048916
- ISBN-13978-1849048910
- PublisherC Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd
- Publication date30 Nov. 2017
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions21.7 x 4 x 14 cm
- Print length424 pages
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Review
‘An extraordinary book … ‘An Intimate War’ is the work of a wise and patient scholar.’ -- James Meek, London Review of Books
'Brilliant.' -- Rory Stewart, The Times Literary Supplement
'A brilliant book.' -- Prospect Magazine
'Martin’s meticulous study, based on 150 interviews conducted over four years, and his own experience as a serving officer in Helmand, presents a view of the war that is radically different from the one the British public has been hearing ever since Tony Blair ordered British troops to deploy in Helmand in 2006. The picture that he paints is often jaw-dropping.' -- Matt Carr, The Huffington Post
‘Among the best books on the Afghan crisis I have come across… immensely detailed.’ -- Robert Fox, Defence Editor of the Evening Standard, The World Today
‘This is the best book ever written on Afghanistan. Martin writes what I have been feeling since the 1980s, but have not expressed in such a clear way. It is a remarkable work of political anthropology.’ -- Olivier Roy, Professor and Chair in Mediterranean Studies, European University Institute
‘A must-read for anyone interested in a detailed history of the British war in Helmand province or the counter-insurgency debate...provides useful insights in the social dynamics of the province before the start of the civil war.’ -- International Affairs
'Essential reading for any serious student of Britain's Fourth Afghan War. A deeply researched, clearly argued, reminder of how the West's road to Helmand was paved with good intentions, and that there, as elsewhere in Afghanistan, the West failed to understand the war it was fighting, causing them to coerce rather than to co-opt.’ -- Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles KCMG LVO, UK Ambassador to Afghanistan 2007-9, and UK Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 2009-10
‘’An Intimate War’ is, quite simply, the book on Helmand. I sincerely wish it had been available to me when I was ISAF Commander in Afghanistan. Military, diplomatic and development professionals involved in Afghanistan - and elsewhere, for that matter - read this and take note.’ -- General Sir David Richards GCB, CBE, DSO, ADC Gen; Commander of International Forces in Afghanistan, 2006-7 and UK Chief of the Defence Staff, 2010-13
'The proverbial complexity of civil wars is typically discounted as irrelevant or misinterpreted through orientalising. Mike Martin begs to differ: in this rich and fascinating account of thirty-four years of war in the Afghan province of Helmand, he explains how and why the private and local logics of the conflict interact with, and often subvert, the public, national, and international narratives. He exposes the failure of Western bureaucratic institutions to grasp this reality and dissects both the causes and consequences of their failure. This outstanding book is a must-read for those interested in understanding contemporary conflict.' -- Stathis Kalyvas, Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science, Yale University, and author of ‘The Logic of Violence in Civil War’
‘This work lays the foundation for much future research, including similarly in-depth looks at the histories of, and counterinsurgencies in, other provinces in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also highlights the need for study into why institutions and militaries adopt mistaken initial premises, and more importantly why groups and individuals retain these flawed conceptions even as it becomes clear that they are failing to achieve their goals. Above all, Martin demonstrates the futility of trying to understand intrastate conflict, much less intervene in such conflicts, without grasping the implications of the local history, culture, politics and social dynamics.’ -- Jessica Jensen, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
‘By far the most detailed account of Helmand province to date, offering both historical background and a chronicle of Helmandi politics in the post-2001 setup. The in-depth analysis of the local political dynamics provided by Martin makes this book a must-read for anybody trying to understand the post-2006 British and American interventions in Helmand.’ -- Antonio Giustozzi, Visiting Professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and editor of ‘Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field’
‘It is impossible to do full justice in this review to the range and depth of Martin’s research, arguments, or account of the Helmand conflict.’ -- Asian Affairs
‘A worthy critical evaluation of the military failure in Helmand . . . clearly demonstrates the need for a critical lessons learned approach to foster and promote deep cultural understanding in the military and above all resist the attempt to impose western values on societies in the pursuit of a western focussed outcome.’
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd (30 Nov. 2017)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 424 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1849048916
- ISBN-13 : 978-1849048910
- Dimensions : 21.7 x 4 x 14 cm
- Best Sellers Rank: 358,106 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- 45,156 in History (Books)
- Customer reviews:
About the author
Mike Martin is the Liberal Democrat MP for Tunbridge Wells. He is a former army officer and author, as well as being a War Studies Senior Fellow at King's College London where he speaks and writes on conflict. He tweets @ThreshedThought.
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Customers find the book informative and academic. They consider it essential reading for anyone involved with or interested in the UK's efforts in Southern. However, opinions differ on readability - some find it well-written and detailed, while others say it's not an easy or light read.
AI-generated from the text of customer reviews
Customers find the book informative and academic. They say it's essential reading for anyone involved with or interested in the UK's efforts in Southern Afghanistan. It adds detail and provides an interesting perspective. Readers mention it deals with complexity and the problems of interpenetrating a fragmented conflict.
"...A very well-written and important book: all the more so for its calm exposition." Read more
"...this said, Martin's analysis provides an excellent account of the Helmandi socio-political conditions into which foreign and domestic interventions..." Read more
"...requires a clear head, patience and mental agility to assimilate the myriad of information documented, including essential and frequent referral to..." Read more
"Deploying in-depth, academic research combined with a highly readable style, Martin sheds welcome light on the multi-layered and ever-shifting..." Read more
Customers have different views on the book's readability. Some find it well-written and detailed, while others consider it a long and difficult read.
"...A very well-written and important book: all the more so for its calm exposition." Read more
"...A Long read - I had to take it in small doses and found it repetitive until I realized the importance of that repetition in establishing the reality..." Read more
"...An exceptionally detailed manuscript which contains 255 pages of normal reading text, followed by 134 pages of varied reference material...." Read more
"Deploying in-depth, academic research combined with a highly readable style, Martin sheds welcome light on the multi-layered and ever-shifting..." Read more
Top reviews from United Kingdom
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- Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 31 October 2015There have been a number of rather whiny books about how Britain got it wrong in Afghanistan: usually written by those with an axe to grind. This book is critical of policy but without the febrile rage and the conspiracy stories. The author speaks Pashto and has had tours in Helmand as an officer and as a civilian adviser. All wars are a series of dialogues within the bodies politic of the combatants (and a war with allies has this in triplicate). But Martin turns the concept on its head by a "customer-centric" approach: "what do the Helmandis think?". He achieves this by talking to a large number of Helmandis. The result will surprise many and shock some: the conclusion is that the British are allied to the Taliban with the aim of destroying Helmand.
To get us into the mindset of the locals Martin voyages through the history of the area including the invasion by the British that included the defeat at Maiwand. With all the fervour of a small rugby nation remembering the time they achieved a surprise victory over a more famous nation the Helmandis treasure Maiwand and the defeat of the perfidious Angrez. The fact that no-one in HMG remembered this when Britain selected Helmand for its ISAF role reveals one key feature of Martin's book: Britain literally did not know what it was doing. This ignorance was amplified by the narrative we chose for the campaign (itself the by-blow of the Bushian them and us narrative). In this case there was a government (good) and (bad) insurgents. The latter oppressed the people and the Government shall set them free.
At certain points this was true but it missed the key point that the people were both in the government and in the "insurgency": they were not neutrals upon whom the two parties acted, but were agents. Many clans would have members with both sides (The Master of Ballantrae approach). If Clan A runs an area (the 'government') then it probably controls the 'police' who are an active part of the local influence economy rather than just crime stoppers; so Clan B will represent the local 'insurgents'. If ISAF helps Clan A it is not necessarily making life better for all, it may simply be assisting in oppressing Clan B. The same issue arises for the Taliban (that is the Quetta and Peshawar shuras): wherever they put 'troops' on the ground they will find local rivalries having a powerful impact. One side or the other may inflict control via its local proxies but in so doing they automatically infuriate the enemies of the local proxy. In short Helmand was a highly developed version of my native Scotland before (and indeed after) the Act of Union (the Government clans would find no difficulty in grasping the situation) or England during the Wars of the Roses where some seemingly odd alliance are explained by looking at the errant nobles' maternal uncles. All politics is local politics and there are no more heartfelt rivalries than local rivalries.
Martin covers all this in detail but one does wonder why the Coalition powers that be (the Clever Men At Oxford as Mr Toad might have said) could not have spotted that where drug eradication is involved local interest would be in having your rivals' poppies eradicated leaving your own. And where there are development funds you send them to your area not to that of their rivals. The last point is clear to anyone in UK in regard to our politics, but abroad we seem to suffer from memory issues.
A very well-written and important book: all the more so for its calm exposition.
- Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 4 July 2014
5.0 out of 5 stars A must read for would-be interventionists, whether you think you 'get it' or not.
"It doesn't matter who you work with in Helmand, they are all the same tribe anyways."
I was told this by an American official in Kandahar in 2011. It was not the time or the place to argue the point that this was a gross mischaracterization of reality and likely to feed into a disastrous engagement with local political divides and factions whose multiple inter- and intra-community conflicts dominate the local political choices made. My perspective at the time was also more macro, not detailed enough to present a convincing argument about Helmand specifically other than in quite general terms.
Mike Martin does not suffer from that short-coming. His multiple rotations as a British officer and subsequent return as a researcher has allowed him to build a comprehensive narrative around the power politics of Helmand from the pre-Mujahideen days until now. Martin's account relies largely on interviews with local power brokers but he has treated the data well, pointing out possible contradictions, instances of possible manipulation, and by seeking confirmation of claims made. The result is a whirling dance in and out of alliances and allegiances that at times is at risk of becoming confusing as the names and locations pile up. Martin however manages to keep the reader on track by back-referencing who is who and playing what role at what time.
This book, and similar accounts of the local reality, should be required reading for development practitioners, military personnel, diplomats, politicians, journalists, and especially the policy wonks who continuously pump out 'analysis' based mainly on six day helicopter and powerpoint tours of [insert area of choice here]. It is however perhaps the most useful for those who think that they already 'get it' and who earnestly wants to understand enough to at least have a glimmer of hope to successfully reach intended outcomes. The lasting impression is that no matter how complex you thought local politics were, they can still find a way to surprise you.
'An intimate war' interprets Helmandi history and the narratives of local power holders through a perspective on violence and civil war largely inspired by S. Kalyvas. It emphasizes the agency of the local groups over the ambitions of the ideological elites at the center or in other countries. I find that I personally agree with most of the dynamics-analysis though I would perhaps ascribe more understanding to the ability of external actors to use local conflicts to gather social mass through mobilization. With this said, Martin's analysis provides an excellent account of the Helmandi socio-political conditions into which foreign and domestic interventions have gone forth so many times before with very little change in the local dynamics apart from patronage structures and what ideological flavor lends its name to local conflicts at a particular time.
In the end, Martin's work aligns perfectly with my own analysis of social mobilization in Afghanistan (and Somalia incidentally) and reinforces what I call the 'ORSDINTI principle'. This is a tongue in cheek memory rule for would-be interventionists to remember that in relation to local outcomes, Our Ranch Salad Dressing Is Not That Important. There are many policy makers and wonks who would do well to remember that. Hopefully, Martin's book can drive that point home. It certainly has the capacity to if the audience is paying attention.
- Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 9 September 2016FULL ON INFORMATION
I was influenced to buy this book after listening to an extremely interesting interview by the author on BBC Radio4 some months back. Listening to the author was far more engaging than wading through his exceedingly intricate book. An exceptionally detailed manuscript which contains 255 pages of normal reading text, followed by 134 pages of varied reference material. Recommended for the specialist, the academic and the researcher; but certainly not for the reader that requires an overview of Helmand & Afghanistan. The reader requires a clear head, patience and mental agility to assimilate the myriad of information documented, including essential and frequent referral to the maps and all annotated reference notes. The reader may also benefit from taking notes, or even plotting a series of schematics on large white board, in order to follow the history of this very complex region. It joins my library as a reference book.
Top reviews from other countries
- Lions BroodReviewed in the United States on 23 July 2022
5.0 out of 5 stars Essential for understanding Afghanistan and its “fall” to the Taliban
As Afghanistan “fell” to the Taliban in August of 2021, to the disbelief of the public in the "West", scholars and journalists engaged in a contentious debate on where our two decades long counterinsurgency and state building efforts went awry. While much of the debate in the “West” focused on our failed attempts to reform and build the Afghan military in the image of the U.S., endemic corruption in the government, and the lack of motivation among Afghan security forces, Dr. Mike Martin (author of this book) emerged as an astute analyst of local dynamics on Twitter and in the media, often correctly predicting the trajectory of local alliances that facilitated the transition from “government” to “Taliban” control in the summer of 2021.
His expertise stems in large part from his research for this book, which he conducted over years as a British Army officer in Helmand and consultant for the British Government, greatly helped by his knowledge of the Pashto language and lengthy interviews with local actors. The central argument of this book is that the conflict in Helmand was shaped in large part by local dynamics consisting of tribal and familial feuds, as well as long standing disputes over water, land, and control of the opium trade in the province. While many commentators in the West have portrayed the conflict in binary and ideological terms – the fundamentalist Taliban vs the democratic government – Dr. Martin’s persuasively argues that local rivalries and tribal loyalties superseded simple categorical distinctions and local actors consistently manipulated outside actors to resolve personal conflicts. In this view, the “Taliban” in Helmand simply consisted of whichever fluid alliance of local actors and tribes happened to oppose the government at that time, while the government and police consisted of their rivals.
With the introduction of British and American forces after 2001, ignorant of the local context, political actors simply manipulated the British and Americans, as they had done to the Soviets before, into eliminating rivals by claiming they were “Taliban”. The Helmandis, as they had always done, simply played both sides to resolve personal disputes, in an ever shifting and extremely complex web of local alliances and family networks in which actors often maintained relationships with all sides to ensure safety and security if one faction prevailed. Our failure to understand that the conflict in Helmand (and by extension Afghanistan) was really a complex local civil war rather than an ideological battle between two cohesive factions (the Taliban and the government), allowed "westerners" to be manipulated by local actors and often lead to U.S. and British support for government actors that engaged in corruption, drug smuggling, and double dealing. These dynamics, which were obvious to the local population, caused many Helmandis to believe that westerners were incredibly stupid and must be working against the goals (development, security, democracy) that they loudly proclaimed.
As the author points out, if the British and U.S. had recognized the local nature of the conflict their entire rationale for bringing democracy and freeing Afghanistan from the Taliban – and by extension our presence in the country – would have been removed entirely. What Helmand really needed was a knowledgeable mediator that could resolve local disputes, not development aid and western counterinsurgency doctrine. While much more could be said about the brilliance of this book and the discussions of development aid, corruption, the role of Pakistan and India, and the local trajectory of the conflict, I will close by saying that this book is essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand our role in Afghanistan and the recent events that contributed to its fall.
Regarding the events of 2021, Afghans simply shifted their alliances to the “Taliban”, much in the same way that they did when the Soviets left in 1989 and when the Americans came in 2001, as it became apparent that the Taliban were likely to win. Although not stated directly, Dr. Martin implies that we may have been better off leaving Afghanistan entirely, and not sinking time and resources in attempting to settle an incredible complex local conflict. As Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal has stated about this book, the sheer complexity of the conflict and the myriad number of actors involved makes any attempt at counterinsurgency in Afghanistan a near futile effort. While revisionist works will likely pop up in the future (as they did after Vietnam) with arguments that we could have succeeded by doing “X” or “Y”, this book is a poignant reminder that such efforts would have been near impossible and that we should always be skeptical of simple narratives and the utility of military power in solving complex conflicts abroad. Although we certainly could have performed better, this books has made me deeply skeptical that any state building project in Afghanistan could have been realized.
In his observations on Helmand, Dr. Martin is also clearly following a venerated recent tradition of civil war scholarship that places local dynamics, rivalries, and politics, rather than ideology, at the center of violence in civil war. For those who wish to read further, I highly recommend Stathis Kalyvas’s The Logic of Violence in Civil War, as the dynamics that Dr. Martin describes are clearly at play in present and past civil wars, although perhaps to a lesser extent than in Helmand. I highly recommend Dr. Martin’s book for anyone interested in understanding Afghanistan and the dynamics of conflict more generally. This is among the best books on these subjects I have ever read and completely eviscerates the prevailing narratives from government and media sources about the sources of the conflict in Afghanistan.
- Michael DaleReviewed in Australia on 6 August 2015
5.0 out of 5 stars Highly recommended for anyone seeking to understand the complexities of COIN ...
A paradigm of the war in Helmand unlike any other and despite the author's comments on the limitations of his work, when read in conjunction with and in contrast to contemporary Western military histories, an absolute relevation. Made me rethink absolutely every data point I had considered in other literature. Highly recommended for anyone seeking to understand the complexities of COIN operations in Helmand.
- william scottReviewed in the United States on 28 October 2021
5.0 out of 5 stars Afghan Gangland
This book is thoughtfully written by a former British army captain who served in the Helmand province during the 20 years between the two Taliban governments. He knew Pashto and conversed with the locals to get the inside view of what was really happening in the Helmand River Valley.
Basically it was an Afghan gangland with opium production and heroin labs driving much of the violence. There was the usual tribal wars which seemed to be worsened by the opium cultivation because all prime growing areas were highly sought after. It was like our inner city gangs fighting over territory to push drugs. The entire Helmand River Valley sounded like Afghan gangland.
The U.S. and its allies fell into this quagmire of local tribal rivalries and drug wars like a fly into a spider's web. Much more to the book and I highly recommend it.
- NHYankeeReviewed in the United States on 29 June 2018
5.0 out of 5 stars Must read if you are interested in Afghanistan.
If you are interested in the REAL story behind our war in Afghanistan you have to read this. I suspected that we were radically ,mismanaging this war because of our ignorance of the region. This books supplies the commentary to support my and the authors premise. I hope there will more books like this describing the real cultures of the Middle East.
- Firouzeh AfsharniaReviewed in the United States on 25 April 2018
5.0 out of 5 stars I am halfway through this wonderful book and I think this should be compulsory reading ...
I am halfway through this wonderful book and I think this should be compulsory reading for any do-gooder wishing to work in Afghanistan. As well as any one else wanting to bring democracy not just to this country, but to any other place when they don't know the history and culture intimately.